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Summary  
Euroisation in Serbia is rooted in a long history of macroeconomic instability. Extreme inflation 
volatility has undermined trust in the dinar and discouraged dinar savings. At the same time, an 
abundant supply of foreign capital inflows has provided easy access to foreign currency lending at 
low interest rates in an environment of perceived exchange rate stability – a perception reinforced by 
the choice of exchange rate regime. As a result, both the asset and the liability side of banks’ 
balance sheets, and even those of the non-bank sector, is heavily foreign currency-denominated. 
This paper documents the forces that promote euroisation in Serbia. The paper argues that, in the 
wake of the global crisis, a window of opportunity has emerged that could foster a process of de-
euroisation. The lack of foreign funding and recent exchange rate volatility has tilted borrower 
incentives towards local currency borrowing. If disinflationary macroeconomic policies gain 
credibility, with the possible support of regulatory options, euroisation could drop sharply.  
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 1 Background 
Serbia is one of the most euroised economies in eastern Europe and on the banks’ balance 
sheets. At 72 per cent, loan euroisation in Serbia is higher than in most eastern European 
countries, be they fixed exchange rate regimes or inflation-targeting regimes where loan 
euroisation is no more than 60 per cent and typically less (see Chart 1).
1 Deposit euroisation 
was similarly high at 68 per cent at end-June 2008 (see Chart 2). In addition, the median 
household respondent to the OeNB’s EuroSurvey reported that they held about €3,500 – 
suggesting an amount in the order of 30 per cent of GDP in aggregate – in euro cash as a 
general reserve (Dvorsky et al., 2008). The median household euro cash holdings exceed 
those in any other central or south-eastern European country.
2 The relatively large euro 
savings of households partly reflect a long history of migrants working in western Europe. 
Although respondents in the OeNB’s survey report that payments are made in dinar in 
compliance with the law, anecdotal evidence suggests a practice of setting prices and wages 
in foreign exchange (FX) and denominating them in dinars only for legal purposes (“real” 
euroisation). Payments for large consumer durables and household investment goods such as 
cars and houses can legally be made and are, in practice, virtually exclusively made in 
foreign currency. While financial and real euroisation runs high, banks themselves do not 
maintain net foreign currency open positions. 



























































































































Source: ISI Emerging Markets, CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
                                                 
1 The figure uses the following assumptions on exchange rate-indexed lending: Serbia: 57 per cent of total local 
currency lending in 2004, 70 per cent in 2008. Croatia: 74 per cent in 2004 and 61 per cent in 2008. FYR 
Macedonia: 43 per cent in 2004 and 2008 based on the reported composition in March 2009. Sources 
underlying these assumptions are annual reports and information directly provided by the respective central 
banks. For all other countries, exchange rate-indexed lending is assumed to be insubstantial. Foreign currency 
lending is not adjusted for valuation effects. 
2 Applying the median euro cash holdings of €3,500 to the total number of Serbian households of some 2,521 
190 (an average household size of three people), suggests total euro cash holdings in the order of 30 per cent of 
2009 nominal GDP.  






























Source: ISI Emerging Markets, CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
 
The share of foreign currency loans peaked in 2007, but has since fallen (see Chart 3). In the 
corporate sector, the share of foreign currency loans (evaluated at current exchange rates) 
peaked in 2005-06, declined substantially in the period of higher exchange rate volatility and 
inflation targeting in 2007-08, and rose again in 2009 as a result of the financial crisis. In the 
household sector, the share of foreign currency loans has remained around 80 per cent 
throughout the period. Valuation effects dampen somewhat the movements. Evaluating 
foreign currency loans at constant 2006 exchange rates, especially the decline in the share of 
FX loans to households in 2008 and 2009 is significantly pronounced, with the share falling 
to around 75 per cent in 2009.  
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Source: National Bank of Serbia. 
Serbia’s high degree of euroisation raises policy challenges, both during tranquil times as 
well as during episodes of turbulence.  
  Euroisation weakens the monetary transmission channel and reduces the effectiveness 
of monetary policy (Aleksić at al. 2008). Monetary policy rates may be reflected in 
lending rates for local currency-denominated loans, but the sheer volume of these 
loans is much less than foreign-currency-denominated loans with little response to 
monetary policy rates.  
  Euroisation limits the use of the exchange rate as a crisis management tool because of 
  2  Euroisation restricts the central bank’s ability to act as lender-of-last resort in the case 
of depositor loss of confidence in its foreign exchange reserves.  
For policy-makers, a shift away from loan euroisation would therefore have important 
benefits but, to be successful, would need to address its root causes. A successful de-
euroisation strategy has to alter the motivation of agents leading to euroisation, however in a 
way that possible negative side effects are minimised. For instance, imposing a ban on FX 
credits to unhedged borrowers may have fast positive results in terms of reducing euroisation, 
but may reduce lending overall and delay the economic recovery.  
A dinarisation strategy would not necessarily weaken the goal of eventual euro adoption in 
the long term. On the contrary, greater monetary policy control would facilitate the process 
of achieving the macroeconomic stability that is the precondition for euro adoption. Serbia 
applied for EU membership in December 2009.  
The next section surveys some of the root causes of euroisation identified in the literature. 
These include macroeconomic instability, the choice of monetary policy regime, under-
pricing of exchange rate risk, and the regulatory and institutional environment. Section III 
assesses how these various root causes apply to Serbia. Section IV concludes. 
  32  Root causes of euroisation — literature survey  
Dollarisation or euroisation is generally analysed as the legacy of monetary and economic 
turbulence and weak institutions, and as a rational self-insurance of economic agents against 
hyper-inflation (“an optimal (prudential) response to a suboptimal policy environment”, Ize, 
2003). Recent explanations have focused on the risk posed not only by the level of inflation 
but also by its second moment, that is, the uncertainties relating to real returns due to the 
volatility of inflation. Besides, other factors, such as institutional bias towards foreign 
currency, market environment or currency blind prudential regulation can provide additional 
causes of euroisation. For an extensive survey of the relevant literature, see Zettelmeyer, 
Nagy and Jeffrey (2010). Here, we only focus on a few key elements that we apply to Serbia 
below.  
2.1 Macroeconomic  environment 
Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) model foreign currency-denominated borrowing based on the 
portfolio choice approach. In acknowledging that expected returns from investing 
(borrowing) in alternative currencies have to yield equal returns under the interest rate parity 
assumption, the portfolio choice approach explains euroisation as a response to second 
moments of expected returns.  
Under a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) model, risk-adverse agents choose the currency 
composition that optimises the risk-return profile of their portfolio, measured in units of the 
local consumption basket. In the simplest form of this approach, the balance of the supply 
and demand of loanable funds leads to uncovered interest rate parity and a share of foreign 
currency lending that minimises the variance of returns on the portfolio (minimum variance 
portfolio allocation or MVP):
3 
  rl: nominal rate of return on local currency deposits 
  rd: nominal rate of return on foreign currency deposits 
  r: average nominal rate of return on all deposits 
  : inflation rate 
  n: rate of nominal depreciation 
  : standard deviation of inflation rate 
  n: standard deviation of nominal depreciation rate 
  n: correlation coefficient between inflation rate and nominal depreciation rate 
  α: euroisation ratio. 
 
                                                 
3 For Serbia, interest rate parity does not necessarily hold in its crude form used here.  
  4From the standpoint of depositors, the return of placing a share α of the portfolio in foreign 
currency and (1– α) in domestic currency can be written as follows:  
 
 
                ( 1 )  
This formula gives a simple analytical benchmark of how changes in the macro environment 
can have an impact on agents’ optimal level of euroisation under the portfolio choice 
paradigm. The optimal level of euroisation stems from the interplay between three 
observable variables: the correlation between inflation and the depreciation rate of the 
domestic currency (“pass-through”), the standard deviation of inflation and the standard 
deviation of the rate of depreciation. For instance, high volatility of inflation is a cause of 
euroisation only if it is high relative to that of the nominal depreciation. Another mechanical 
consequence of the formula is that euroisation should ceteris paribus increase with the 
degree of openness of the economy as reflected in the pass-through, and with the level of 
“real euroisation” (pricing of goods in euros) that generally results in higher pass-through 
effects. 
Formula (1) highlights how different policy actions aimed at reducing inflation can generate 
similar MVP outcomes. For instance, a monetary policy that reduces volatility in nominal 
depreciation faster (“fear of floating”) than inflation volatility may fail to reduce euroisation 
(Chamon and Hausmann, 2003). At the extreme, in a credible currency board regime, the 
volatility of depreciation is zero and, hence, the MVP undetermined. The anchor and local 
currency are indistinguishable and the calculated MVP becomes irrelevant. 
An important caveat to the portfolio approach is the importance of expectations and 
institutional credibility. In its simplest approach the MVP calculations are backward-looking 
and reflect only past macroeconomic performances. At times, however, the observed ex post 
volatilities do not necessarily reflect the ex ante expectations agents held over that period – 
and expectations are what agents base their currency choice on. This measurement problem is 
especially acute in emerging market environments where short time series are a poor guide to 
agents’ true expectations.  
The measured MVP in formula (1) based on observed volatility may therefore deviate 
significantly from the true MVP based on expectations about volatility. Agents’ portfolio 
choices can be dictated by purely backward-looking considerations. Expectations may, for 
instance, remain purely backward-looking when agents do not believe that a recent change in 
macroeconomic policies will be sustained – a case of a credibility deficit. In this case, 
euroisation hysteresis can result, with the actual foreign currency share of deposits exceeding 
the calculated MVP, if macro policies have changed fundamentally but expectations have 
not.
 4 Alternatively, agents’ expectations can be more forward-looking than based on past 
performances, for instance when far-reaching changes in the institutional environment (like 
central bank independence) and recent delivery of a more stable macro environment reduce 
                                                 
4 Also observed in Latin America (Rennhack and Nozaki, 2005). 
  5the weight given to past observations — a case of a credibility boost.  
Another way of computing the MVP, is therefore to use ex ante volatilities implied by a 
macroeconomic model calibrated to the particular policy regime and period of history. The 
model approach can also be used for inferring changes in the optimal euroisation levels in the 
future as a function of changes in monetary and exchange rate policies. However, this 
approach assumes that agents credibly believe the policy regime embedded in the model – a 
strong assumption. 
For our calculations below for Serbia specifically we use a combination of the ex post (that 
is, data-based) and ex ante (that is, model-based) approaches in gauging the expected 
volatilities of macroeconomic variables and deriving a ballpark range of the euroisation 
levels implied by macroeconomic fundamentals.  
2.2  Monetary policy regime, supervisory and institutional environment 
Other factors play a contributing role in cementing euroisation. These highlight that 
euroisation is a “market response to a suboptimal market, legal or regulatory asymmetries 
that favour the [foreign currency]” (Ize and Levy-Yeyati, 2003). They are as follows: 
  fear of floating in monetary policy caused by balance sheet mismatches 
  under-pricing of foreign currency risk implicit in credit risk 
  institutional factors such as the supervisory environment or the market environment 
(the shortage of domestic currency-denominated investment vehicles).  
Monetary policy endogeneity—“fear of exchange rate floating” caused by balance sheet 
mismatches — is another element of euroisation hysteresis. In a highly dollarised 
environment, the central bank may be tempted to peg or tightly control the exchange rate to 
protect the economy from the balance sheet effect of depreciations: monetary policy becomes 
hostage to the “fear of floating”. The implicit socialisation of the risks attached to currency 
mismatches via the exchange rate policy may generate moral hazard and hence reinforce 
dollarisation. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) summarise the authorities’ revealed “fear of 
floating” into one index, defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of the exchange rate to 
the sum of the standard deviation of the FX reserves and local interest rates. The index is 
close to zero for countries dampening exchange rate movements by systematic FX 
intervention or by systematic adjustment of domestic interest rates. 
Jeanne (2002) describes how under-pricing of credit risk can lead to euroisation hysteresis. 
Borrowers and lenders may under-price indirect credit risk induced by foreign currency 
lending to unhedged borrowers. By embedding a negative risk premium into interest rates, 
this may increase the myopic incentive to borrow in foreign currency. The often higher 
recovery value of FX-denominated claims in the case of joint devaluation and bankruptcy 
also strengthens lenders’ incentives for foreign currency lending. The interest wedge in 
favour of the euro can also, via an adverse selection process, result in a greater concentration 
of more risky projects to less creditworthy borrowers that will in the case of bankruptcy, 
generate a lower recovery value of domestic currency-denominated claims. 
The regulatory and institutional environment may also be conducive to under-pricing of 
foreign currency-related credit risk and euroisation hysteresis. “Currency-blind” supervisory 
frameworks failing to account for risks from indirect currency mismatches may let “negative 
  6risk premia” widen the interest rate wedge in favour of foreign currency lending. Likewise, 
the existence of a “currency blind” safety net, with for example, a deposit insurance 
framework not discriminating between local and foreign currency deposits, or the existence 
of a lender of last resort facility in foreign currency de facto reinforces the attractiveness of 
foreign currency lending (Broda and Levy-Yeyati, 2006). 
Public policy choices also often distort incentives in favour of foreign currency. Interest rate 
subsidies given to FX loans will strengthen euroisation. Many countries provide some kind of 
interest rate subsidies on deposits or loans – often for special purpose vehicles (such as 
building society programmes) or special interest groups (small and medium-sized enterprises, 
start-ups). In euroised countries such subsidies are often also provided for FX deposits and 
loans, thus contributing to the euroisation bias. Furthermore, some countries allow public 
companies to run unhedged open FX positions, reducing the supply of local currency 
deposits as well as demand for long-term local currency instruments. 
Lastly, underdeveloped local currency and hedging markets combined with abundant and 
easy access to foreign funding may reduce the relative price of foreign currency loans. A lack 
of trust in local currency savings instruments often combines with a lack of high-credit 
quality investment vehicles in local currency. The result is a dearth of long-term savings in 
local currency. Easy access to abundant foreign currency liquidity from abroad (through 
parent banks or remittances) may therefore result in high interest rate differentials between 
local currency-denominated and foreign currency-denominated financial services. In 
addition, the lack of a liquid government bonds and bill market in local currency beyond the 
shortest maturities means that pricing benchmarks for financial instruments denominated in 
local currency and hedging products are missing. In the absence of developed hedging 
instruments the best hedge for importers is to set prices in foreign currency.  
The dominant role of foreign-owned banks in capital flows can also be a euroisation factor 
(Luca and Petrova, 2008). Chart 4 shows a clear correlation between Western (mostly parent) 
bank exposures to emerging Europe and the share of foreign currency lending in these 
economies. In a context of market failure (in particular, an absence of instruments to hedge 
the foreign currency risk on banks’ balance sheets) and of strong prudential constraints on net 
foreign currency open positions, banks might prefer to transfer the foreign currency risks to 
customers and to maximise the asset expansion potential stemming from their privileged 
access to parent bank funding in foreign currency.  
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Source: BIS, CEIC, National Authorities, and International Monetary Fund WEO. 
  83  Root causes of euroisation in Serbia  
3.1  Macroeconomic environment and monetary policy regime  
Serbia’s euroisation is consistent with backward-looking MVP calculations that yield a level 
of 75 per cent (see Chart 5). The MVP calculations suggest that euroisation is primarily an 
issue of macroeconomic policy credibility. Economic agents do not seem to give credit to 
policy-makers for recent achievements in disinflation and continue to manage their risks 
based on inflation, exchange rate volatility and pass-through expectations very much 
denominated by past performance over a long time span. This hypothesis is supported by the 
inertia in inflation expectations, and by anecdotal reports that interpret the most recent 
inflation gains as driven by cyclical factors (for example, the large output gap in 2009) rather 
than by more effective policies.
 5 















                                                
 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
This finding reflects the turbulent economic and monetary history of Serbia over the last two 
decades (see Chart 6). The Yugoslav dinar denomination was changed four times between 
1990 and 1994, a period of hyperinflation. In 1994, it was finally pegged to the Deutsche 
mark. With the gap between the official and the black market exchange rate widening, the 
dinar was eventually officially devalued (by 400 per cent) against the Deutschmark in 2000, 
producing high inflation. Inflation was over 100 per cent annually in Serbia in 2000 at a time 
when many other economies in the region were enjoying inflation rates below 10 per cent or 
were fast disinflating.   
 
5 In the chart, the MVP was derived using the expression contained in the appendix of Ize and Levy-Yeyati 
(2003) based on different assumptions about interest rates:  . Equation (1) is based on 
the assumption that interest rates are fixed over the portfolio period and based on an assumed relationship 
between the foreign currency interest rate and the REER as well as between the domestic lending rate and 
inflation which do not seem to hold well in Serbia. Ex post, the relationships between FX interest rates and 
REER and LC interest rates and inflation appear not to hold. Here, our calculation is based on monthly data but 
results are very similar if the calculation is based on quarterly data.  
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From 2003 (after hyperinflation)
 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. 
 
More recently, the NBS has made considerable progress in disinflation. Nevertheless, 
inflation, while considerably less volatile and generally lower over the last seven years than 
during the 1990s, has remained one of the most volatile in the region. The standard deviation 
of inflation measured post-hyper inflation (from 2003 onwards) is still above the regional 
average (three for Serbia, against a regional average of two). Also, disinflation has at times 
taken place in “favourable” circumstances, making it difficult for economic agents to 
disentangle monetary policy performance from good luck in assessing inflation trends. 
During 2006-07, speculative pressures led to a short-lived appreciation and in 2009-10 a deep 
recession caused a wide output gap.  
Nevertheless, the data suggest a degree of “fear of floating”. During 2001-06, the authorities’ 
tight management of the exchange, despite the official classification as a managed floating 
exchange rate regime, created asymmetric incentives for economic agents. The NBS 
intervened frequently, heavily, and asymmetrically in the foreign exchange rate market, 
overwhelmingly with foreign exchange sales and very few purchases until about 2006 (see 
Chart 7). The Calvo-Reinhart “fear of floating index” shows Serbia from 2004-07 as the 
country steering its exchange rate most tightly in the region (see Chart 8). The launch of 
inflation targeting was accompanied by a willingness to let the exchange rate appreciate in 
2007-09. While this was a significant change, it coincided with a period when the observed 
volatility was only one-sided, with appreciation pressures predominating and distorting the 
perception of two-way risk that is key for low euroisation (Equation (1)).  
 







































































































Net FX interventions through auctions (right scale)
Net bilateral OTC interventions (right scale)
Calvo-Reinhart index, moving average MA (left scale)
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF IFS database. 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF IFS database. 
Although the NBS allowed a substantial depreciation at the onset of the crisis in late 2008, it 
later intervened systematically, from a strong reserve position, to prevent what it regarded as 
excessive depreciation. The intervention de facto acknowledged the potential impact of 
depreciation on private and public balance sheets (fear of floating). Although the intervention 
volumes in 2009 were limited, the exchange rate remained broadly stable from the beginning 
of 2009 to April 2010, thus contributing to a perception of low risk of FX-denominated loans 
(but also reducing somewhat the attractiveness of FX-denominated deposits).  
Of course, in Serbia’s case, “fear of floating” may not only have been the reflection of 
  11policy-makers’ concern over liability euroisation that Calvo and Reinhart highlight. Serbia’s 
policy goal remains EU accession, European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) entry, and 
eventual euro adoption. The pre-requisite for ERM participation and euro adoption remains 
macroeconomic stability including avoiding excessive exchange rate fluctuations.  
What will happen to the MVP if expectations adjust to a new monetary policy regime? We 
calculate the forward-looking MVP that models a path of changing expectations as monetary 
policy becomes more credible. We use the NBS macroeconomic projection model that 
supports monetary policy decisions of the NBS since 2007. The model is a standard small 
New-Keynesian model of monetary policy transmission in flows (gaps), as in Berg et al. 
(2006a, b). It is summarised in the Appendix. Although the model has been modified and 
recalibrated several times since 2007, most of these changes were minor and we take its 
current version as successfully fitting the transmission mechanism in the period from 2007 
until the end of 2008, when the NBS resumed heavier exchange rate management in the wake 
of the crisis. For MVP computations we use the second order unconditional moments (that is, 
variances and covariances) of model variables. These moments are given by the model 
dynamics and the variances of the model’s structural shocks. The variances of the structural 
shocks are computed as actual variances of the shocks realised when simulating the model on 
history from 2004.
6  
We employ the model in two ways. First, we compute the MVP on the basis of the current 
model calibrated to the period 2007-08. This allows us to gauge the optimal level of 
euroisation implied by the IT regime introduced in late 2006 under the assumption that the 
public correctly understood the regime’s implication for the macroeconomic volatility as 
described by the model. Second, we modify the model’s uncovered interest rate parity to 
account for various degrees of exchange rate management – indexed from 0 (tightly 
managed) to 1 (fully flexible) and compute the MVPs for various degrees of the exchange 
rate control and periods in history.
7  
The model suggests that the currently observed degree of euroisation reflects a lack of 
monetary policy credibility (see Table 1). The current degree of euroisation is close to that 
predicted by the model, assuming a tightly managed exchange rate (above 70 per cent). The 
transition to a more flexible exchange rate regime that occurred in late 2006, if credible, 
should have led to a substantial reduction in MVP by more than half. The more flexible 
exchange rate regime as practised by the NBS at least until the crisis in late 2008 was 
therefore a good basis for reducing euroisation. Its main problem was that it was (i) not 
sufficiently credible, and (ii) it lasted only a very brief period – in 2009 the NBS reverted to 
managing the exchange rate, which is consistent with higher euroisation ratios.  
                                                 
6 The simulation fixes all endogenous model variables on the observed historical values and computes the 
shocks (residuals) consistent with such a behaviour of model variables. We compute the variances of the time 
series of these simulated shocks and use them as values of model shock variances in computing the second 
order unconditional moments of model variables.  
7 The modification to the uncovered interest rate parity follows Berg et al. (2009) and Benes et al. (2008). 
  12Table 1: MVPs under different assumptions about exchange rate expectations 
MVP (per cent)\Period 2004q1:2010q1
Modified model with a highly 
managed exchange rate
74
Modified model with a moderately 
managed exchange rate*
22.8





Source: Author’s calculations.  
3.2  Supervisory and institutional environment  
The supervisory framework in Serbia has “currency-blind” and “currency-conscious” 
elements, but on balance the “currency-blind” elements predominate. In the spirit of 
transitioning towards Basel II, the NBS has aimed at strengthening banks’ risk management 
capacities rather than imposing restrictions on intermediation in foreign currency, with for 
example, the obligation for banks to document the methodology used to evaluate borrowers’ 
FX risk. To ensure that banks’ risk management took into account indirect foreign currency 
risk, risk weights were substantially higher for foreign-currency denominated or foreign-
currency indexed loans to unhedged borrowers (Box 1). The classification of a borrower as 
hedged or unhedged, however, remained at the discretion of banks and is only ascertained at 
the occasion of onsite visits. 
Concerns about fast credit growth led to the imposition of gradually increasing reserve 
requirements on foreign currency liabilities. The reserve requirement peaked at 45 per cent 
on the eve of the crisis but its effectiveness is still open for debate. Mirzoev (2008) 
concluded that the reserve requirement mainly led to disintermediation — with local credit 
growth slowing only temporarily but direct cross-border lending rising rapidly — but had 
only a modest impact on financial vulnerabilities. 
Some elements of the regulatory safety net are “currency blind”, others are not. For example, 
the deposit insurance scheme reimburses deposits in their original currency of denomination 
and thus, given the mistrust of the local currency, tilts incentives towards deposit euroisation. 
As a result of this deposit insurance arrangement, in 2002 the government eventually repaid 
deposits frozen in 1991 in their currency of denomination. Foreign currency deposits were 
repaid in full while local currency deposits had lost their value during the period of 
hyperinflation. In contrast, high reserve requirements and capital surcharges on FX-induced 
credit risk may have helped to reduce the overall expansion of credit in euros and thus 
prevented further excess credit growth and loan euroisation.  
Government policy has also been ambiguous. A crisis-related loan interest subsidy was 
introduced in 2009 which initially only applied to foreign currency loans. Later it was 
extended to local currency loans but, compared with the interest rate differential on local 
currency loans, the subsidy remains stronger for foreign currency loans. In addition, until 
2009, government borrowing at all levels of government, including state-owned enterprises, 
  13has been predominantly in foreign currency. Sovereign debt policy has also only recently 
shifted towards local currency Treasury bills (T-bills) issuance. Four-fifths of the sovereign 
stock of debt remains foreign currency-denominated. 
 
Box 1: Regulation of the FX-induced credit risk in the NBS supervisory framework 
Debt service-to-income ratios: A debt service-to-income ratio of 30 per cent for loans that do not 
match the currency of borrower income and 40 per cent for loans that do.  
Net open FX position: The foreign exchange risk ratio represents the ratio between the bank’s total 
net open foreign currency position (including the absolute value of net open position in gold) and 
banks’ capital. FX assets and liabilities include assets and liabilities denominated in dinars indexed to 
foreign currency. The foreign exchange risk ratio at the end of any business day may not exceed 20 
per cent of its capital. 
Capital adequacy: The risk weight for claims in foreign currency or foreign currency indexed for 
borrowers with matched foreign currency position and secured by a mortgage is 50 per cent. The risk 
weight for a similar loan to a borrower without an unmatched foreign currency position is 75 per cent 
The risk weight for a similar loan to a borrower without an unmatched foreign currency position but 
not secured by cash collateral is 125 per cent. 
Identification of FX unhedged borrowers: Banks have to report the methodology used to classify 
borrowers with matched and/or unmatched foreign currency position, and shall present such 
documents when compiling the prescribed supervisory reports. Banks are obliged to define the 
methodology used for the identification and measure of credit risk arising from exchange rate 
movements on the borrower’s financial position, as well as the manner of managing such risk. 
Analysis of the borrower's exposure to the exchange rate risk and of its ability to meet its payment 
obligations is mandatory for loan classification. 
Documentation of the FX exposure: The credit file has to contain an appraisal of financial standing 
and creditworthiness of the borrower, including an analysis of the borrower’s exposure to foreign 
exchange rate risk. 
Loan classification: FX loans and indexed loans to retail clients with a loan-to-value ratio above 70 
per cent are placed in category E unless at the time of loan approval (the most recent update of the 
credit file) the debt-service-to-income ratio was below 30 per cent (50 per cent). 
  144  A window of opportunity 
The current environment provides a window of opportunity. The crisis has made both the 
policy-makers and private sector alike acutely aware of the euroisation dangers. Private and 
public sectors recognised the fragility of their unhedged open positions. The central bank, in 
particular, recognised the vulnerability of its inflation targeting policies to financial stability 
concerns arising from unhedged private sector balance sheets.  
As a result, policy-makers’ support for disinflation and de-euroisation has strengthened and 
they are launching a coordinated effort. The NBS is fully committed to reducing inflation 
below 4 per cent over the next two years. In addition, it has recently taken measures to 
support the development of hedging markets by offering FX swaps. The Ministry of Finance 
is committed to maintain a vibrant T-bill market that can be a pricing benchmark for local 
currency financial instruments and extending its maturity. The Treasury bill market has 
developed successfully since interest rates began to be more market-based in early 2009. The 
maturity has lengthened from 3 months to 24 months; the yield has dropped from above 16 
per cent to below 10 per cent; and most auctions have been heavily oversubscribed. Banks 
have begun benchmarking the pricing of their dinar-denominated loans against T-bill yields. 
The next challenge is to extend the yield curve to 24 months and to encourage a secondary 
market in T-bills, which could possibly be encouraged by facilitating access of small savers 
to the T-bill market. Another possibility is to supplement the Treasury bill market with a 
municipal bond market in local currency, provided strong restrictions exist to safeguard fiscal 
sustainability.  
A key bottleneck to reducing incentives for euroisation is macroeconomic policy and the 
external environment. The external environment will likely become more conducive to de-
euroisation over the next few years. The sources of foreign currency that fuelled high 
euroisation in bank liabilities during the past decade are likely to shrink. Access of foreign 
banks to low-priced parent bank funding will decline as parent banks rebalance their 
portfolios in home and host markets and euro area interest rates rise post-crisis. Remittances, 
a source of foreign currency deposit growth, may start a secular decline with the Schengen 
visa reform. The likely increase in Serbians who travel, together with fewer visits from 
overseas workers, may reduce these flows. As a result of less bank funding in foreign 
currency, its relative cost—the interest rate differential with local currency funding — may 
be less supportive to euro lending. Nevertheless, while the external environment may benefit 
narrowing euroisation incentives, the process has to be supported with appropriate policy 
choice — including reducing policy-makers’ fear of floating.  
While macroeconomic credibility is being built, many supporting measures should be 
implemented in the short to medium term. Some of these are summarised in Table 2 below. 
These include policies to develop local currency markets, beginning with government debt 
markets; remove market failures in the derivatives market; and tilt supervisory incentives 
towards local currency lending. International financial institutions (IFIs) play a special role in 
the development of local currency capital markets since they can issue local currency-
denominated bonds and, in the process, reveal any legal and regulatory restrictions to capital 
market development. A host of supervisory measures has been considered in other countries.   
  Limits could be introduced on net open foreign currency positions of borrowers to the 
extent that they can be enforced.  
  Many countries provide fiscal subsidies to long-term local currency savings vehicles, 
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risk could be strengthened to include realistic simulations of debt service ratios. 
Awareness of foreign currency risk could be supported by banning euro-based price 
advertisements.  
  More aggressive measures include restrictions on retail and short-term lending in 
foreign currency to unhedged borrowers, mostly lower-income households and the 
public sector. Facilitating conversion into local currency once the exchange rate 
depreciation surpasses a threshold has been considered in other countries, combined 
with a lengthening of loan maturities without quality impairment for regulatory 
purposes. 
The focus of any short-term measures will likely be on positive incentives for local currency 
lending rather than on repressing foreign currency lending. Many borrowers are still 
distressed as a result of the crisis and credit standards have tightened. Active restrictions on 
foreign currency lending therefore would need to be timed to coincide with a more 
entrenched economic upswing. In principle, measures to reduce FX lending could address 
either the stock or the flow of new FX loans. If measures to reduce the flow of FX loans 
succeed, the stock of FX loans will start adjusting in two to three years, given the duration of 
an average bank portfolio.  
Any attempt to reduce euroisation in Serbia will require the buy-in of all stakeholders: the 
authorities, local banks and parent banks, home supervisors and IFIs. In the context of the 
Vienna Initiative (European Bank Coordination Initiative), the NBS launched such a broad-
based effort in 2010.  
In conclusion, loan euroisation in Serbia is deep-rooted. Even in the ideal policy 
environment, it will, therefore, only decline gradually over time. However, in the meantime, 
several regulatory and policy steps, as outlined above, can and are being put in place that 
make the environment more conducive to loan dinarisation.  
  16Table 2: Serbia: root causes of euroisation 
Causes Identified in the 
Literature Relevance for Serbia Policy options for Serbia
Macroeconomic instability
A history of severe volatility 
since the 1990s
Press ahead with macroeconomic policy 
targeted at disinflation
Fear of Floating
With the exception of the period 
2007-2009, intervention has 
been systematically biased 
towards one direction.
Under the inflation-targeting framework, 
avoid exchange rate interventions 
biased systematically in one direction
Underpricing of foreign currency-
related credit risk
Higher reserve requirement on 
FX liabilities than on LC 
liabilities (despite recent cut); 
Differentiated debt service-to-
income ratios by currency.
Amend regulation to restrict the FX 
exposure of the most vulnerable 
segments of unhedged borrowers, in 
particular short-term unsecured 
consumer loans; enhance disclosure of 
FX risk with debt service scenarios 
under depreciation; remunerate reserve 
requirements on local currency liabilities 
only; consider amending provisioning 
rules to facilitate currency conversion of 
loans.
Supervisory and institutional 
environment
Deposit insurance that repays 
deposits in the currency of 
denomination; government 
subsidies that are available for 
FX and LC loans.
Eliminate loan interest subsidies on FX 
loans; reduce access of public 
companies to FX loans unless for 
hedging purposes; consider subsidy for 
longterm savings vehicles, fiscal 
resources permitting.
Underdeveloped hedging and 
funding markets
Government bond market has 
been deepening rapidly since 
2009; nascent secondary 
trading; central bank initiative to 
encourage development of FX 
swaps.
Increase LC share of government 
borrowing; increase liquidity and 
maturities in government bond and bill 
market; broaden access to government 
bond and bill market for smaller savers; 
consider market-based FX hedging of 
government FX transactions.
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  19Appendix  
This appendix gives background information on the macroeconomic model used in the ex-
ante model based calculations of the MVP euroisation levels. In our experiments we employ 
the NBS macroeconomic projection model and its modifications for different degrees of the 
exchange rate flexibility.  
The NBS macroeconomic projection model (Djukic at al., 2010) is a semi-structural “gap” 
model of the monetary transmission based on the New Keynesian theory. It follows a long 
tradition of using small gap models in supporting policy in inflation targeting (IT) central 
banks, as in Berg et al. (2006a,b) or Benes et al. (2003).  
Such small gap models have both nominal and real rigidities, and the main mechanism 
driving inflation over the business cycle are the fluctuations of real variables (such as output 
and real exchange rate) around their long-term trends. These models embody the main 
principles of monetary policy-making in IT central banks, such as the long-term monetary 
neutrality, a flexible exchange rate and the main interest rate transmission channel.  
The advantage of the semi-structural approach is the flexibility in calibrating the small 
models to account for many empirical phenomena that are important for interest-rate setting 
– especially in the emerging market context.  
These models typically consist of six behavioural equations that represent aggregate demand 
(IS curve), aggregate supply (Phillips curve), imported goods inflation, the uncovered interest 
rate parity condition, the term structure and the policy-reaction function (Taylor rule). In 
addition, there are several identities. 
The NBS model differs from a standard gap model in the following main ways. 
  Core, oil and other non-core inflation rates are modelled by separate equations. 
  In addition to output, real exchange rate fluctuations are an inflation-driving force in 
the aggregate supply (Phillips curve) equation of core inflation reflecting the high 
import dependence of the Serbian economy.  
  Foreign real interest rate enters the aggregate demand equation reflecting the high 
euroisation in Serbia. 
  The expectations of inflation and exchange rate have both a backward and forward-
looking component. The backward-looking element of the exchange rate expectations 
also reflects a policy preference towards smoothing the exchange rate fluctuations 
through interventions. 
  All relative prices in the model are stochastic stationary. 
In computing the ex-ante MVP euroisation levels we used the model and its calibration as of 
April 2010. We consider the calibration to be representative of the behaviour of the economy 
and policy since the end of 2006 until the end of 2008, when the NBS resorted to heavy 
interventions in the wake of the crisis. The model’s structure, the parameter values and the 
estimated shock standard errors from this period imply a variance-covariance matrix of the 
model variables that enter in computing the MVP euroisation level. This is the euroisation 
level we should expect, if the model successfully captures the actual dynamics of the 
economy and, crucially, if the agents perceive monetary policy and a relatively flexible 
exchange rate regime the same way as implied by the model.  
  20Furthermore, we modify the process of forming exchange rate expectations in the model to 
allow for different degrees of exchange rate flexibility. This allows us to investigate the 
possibility that the agents actually do not perceive the exchange rate the same way as 
captured by the NBS projection model.  
In particular, the NBS projection model has the following process for the exchange rate 
expectations (Djukic et al., 2010): 
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where  refers to the expected next period exchange rate formed as a weighted average 
of the model implied expected exchange rate next period  
1  t tls E
1 t ls  (the forward-looking 
component) and the previous period level of the exchange rate  1 t ls  adjusted for the trend in 




t t    (together the backward-looking component). 
Although the backward-looking component reflects to some extent the fact that monetary 
policy smoothes the exchange rate movements through interventions, varying the coefficient 
 does not allow for capturing various degrees of exchange rate flexibility (Benes et al. 
2008).  
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Following Benes et al. (2008) and Berg et al. (2009) we therefore modify the exchange rate 
expectation equations in the following way: 
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.    (A2) 
The coefficient  now represents an index of the exchange rate regime flexibility. For  close 
to zero, the exchange rate will be fully backward-looking – that is, tightly managed. For 
 close to unity the exchange rate expectations will be fully rational – that is, full exchange 
rate flexibility. As discussed by Benes et al. (2008)   can also be chosen so as to replicate 
very closely the dynamics of the original model with A1. 
We calculate the MVP euroisation levels implied by different degrees of the exchange rate 
flexibility by replacing the equation A1 by A2 in the NBS projection model and re-estimating 
the volatilities of the model structural shocks for different values of  .  
This procedure allows us to:  
a)  gauge the actual degree of the exchange rate flexibility perceived by the agents in 
Serbia (assuming the observed euroisation levels are purely driven by perceived 
macroeconomic volatilities) 
b)  assess the extent of possible de-euroisation that could occur as a result of 
strengthening the functioning of the flexible exchange rate IT regime and its 
credibility among the Serbian public. 
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